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ABSTRACT
Letendre, Fincher & Thornhill (2010) argue that pathogen intensity provides the ultimate explanation for why some
countries are more prone to civil war than others. They argue that the economic and political factors highlighted in
previous research on civil war are largely caused by underlying differences in pathogen intensity, and contend that
disease proneness increases the risk of civil war through its effects on resource competition and xenophobia. They
present empirical evidence that they interpret as consistent with their argument: a statistically significant correlation
between pathogen intensity and civil war onset. In this comment, we raise concerns over their interpretation of the
empirical evidence and their proposed causal mechanisms. We find that the data provide stronger evidence for the
reverse causal relationship, namely that civil war causes disease to become more prevalent. This finding is consistent
with the literatures on the public health effects of civil war as well as research on state capacity and public health.
Key words: civil war, collectivism-individualism, infectious disease, intrastate armed conflict, national wealth, pathogens,
parasite.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent study published in Biological Reviews, Letendre,
Fincher & Thornhill (2010, henceforth LFT) argue that
pathogen intensity provides the ultimate explanation for
why some countries are more prone to civil war than
others. They argue that the economic and political factors
identified in previous research on civil war are largely
caused by underlying differences in pathogen intensity,
and contend that disease proneness increases the risk of
civil war through its effects on resource competition and
* Address for correspondence: (E-mail: chendrix@wm.edu).
xenophobia. They present empirical evidence that they
interpret as consistent with their argument. In this comment,
we raise concerns over their interpretation of the empirical
evidence as well as their proposed causal mechanisms.
Empirically, we present evidence that the causal arrow
likely runs in the opposite direction of what LFT propose:
civil conflict may cause disease to spread. Theoretically,
we argue that LFT miss the central roles that the state
plays both in civil war and providing better public health
outcomes. Although LFT deserve credit for highlighting
possible linkages between disease and conflict, we believe
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that their theoretical argument is questionable and their
empirical analysis is not sufficiently robust to support their
conclusions.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION
LFT test the effect of pathogen intensity on civil conflict
in two ways. First, they estimate time-series cross-sectional
logistic regressions with the country-year as the unit of
analysis for the period 1946–2004. They then collapse the
time series information into a single observation per country
and run a cross-sectional logistic regression.
We believe that the empirical estimates presented by
LFT are problematic because they use pathogenic severity
measured in 2007 to account for conflict over the period
1946–2004. As LFT note, regression analysis with country-
years as observations is a standard approach in the
political science and economics literatures on intrastate
conflict, although we note that unlike the studies they
cite, LFT do not have longitudinal information on their
main variable of interest—pathogen severity—nor do they
consider autoregressive controls, which are important as civil
war often recurs and some of the current covariates could
reflect the impact of previous conflict (see Collier & Hoeffler,
2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006).
LFT’s measure of pathogen intensity, the Contemporary
Pathogen Severity Index (Fincher et al., 2008) is a composite
index indicating prevalence of diseases resulting from
22 parasites from seven groups. Fincher et al. (2008) collected
data on the prevalence of these diseases between April and
August of 2007. Our concern is not with the quality of the
data per se, but that this measure of pathogen intensity is
used to test a causal argument about the effect of pathogen
intensity on civil conflicts that occurred between 1946 and
2004—a period prior to the collection of the pathogen
severity data.
Static, time-invariant variables in dynamic analysis can
provide evidence of a causal relationship only when there
is either no potential for simultaneity or when the static
observation is clearly prior to period of interest. For instance,
the relationship between mountainous terrain and civil
conflict (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006)
may be interpreted causally because there is virtually no
potential for conflict to alter the physical terrain in any
meaningful way. Alternately, the effect of colonial institutions
on subsequent civil conflict (Blanton, Mason & Athow,
2001; Djankov & Reynal-Querol, 2007) could be interpreted
causally because colonial institutions predated the observed
civil wars, in some cases by over a century.
In the case of disease and civil war, however, we need to
consider the potential for reverse causality, namely that high
pathogen severity may be an outcome of conflict, or features
associated with conflict, rather than a prior cause. The
public health literature provides substantial evidence that
disease can be promoted by civil conflict. Raoult et al. (1998)
document how the largest outbreak of epidemic typhus since
World War II occurred in Burundi among refugees that
had been displaced by civil wars in Burundi, neighbouring
Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The
authors note that louse infestations—and the pathogens
borne by them—are a major health threat in war-torn
regions around the world. At a more general level, several
studies have documented the detrimental public health effects
of civil conflict (Ghobarah, Huth & Russet, 2003; Li & Wen,
2005; Plu¨mper & Neumayer, 2006). Civil conflicts tend to
displace populations, forcing large numbers of people to live
in conditions often lacking in basic sanitation and access
to clean drinking water. These are precisely the conditions
under which pathogen vectors, such as mosquitoes and body
and head lice, tend to flourish.
Thus, LFT may well have the causal arrow reversed:
conflict and pathogen severity correlate because conflict has
negative effects on the living conditions of persons in conflict
zones and diminishes both state and societal capacity to
address public health problems. Controlling for pathogen
severity prior to the outbreak of conflict, we would expect
that conflict prevalence would be positively associated with
disease prevalence observed post-conflict. Or alternatively,
we could have a spurious relationship, as other factors
associated with a higher risk of civil war, such as weak states,
poor governance and discriminatory government policies,
also may be associated with higher incidence of disease. We
note that LFT’s results could be seen as consistent with this,
as the Pathogen Severity Index in many of their regressions is
not significant once they control for gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita, which the authors oddly interpret as evidence
that GDP per capita must be determined by pathogen severity.
Ideally, one should test the possibility of reverse causality
using Contemporary Pathogen Severity Index values
collected prior to the window of observation. Unfortunately,
such data do not appear to exist at the present. Instead, we
use a proxy for pathogen severity, the percentage of 1995
population living in areas of malaria transmission in 1946,
to approximate pathogen severity prior to the observation
of conflict, using data from Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger
(1999). The two variables (2007 pathogen severity and 1946
population in areas of malaria transmission) are positively
and relatively highly correlated (r = 0.57, p = 0.00) for the
relevant sample of countries. We then estimate the effect
of conflict prevalence, the log of a count variable of the
years of civil conflict experienced by a country from 1947 to
2006, on pathogen severity in 2007, controlling for pathogen
severity prior to the window of observation. This (logged)
count variable ranges from zero to 4.07, and is a better
measure of conflict prevalence than the dummy coding used
as an outcome indicator in LFT’s analysis. For example, a
dummy coding would classify Kenya (with a single year of
civil conflict) and Myanmar (with 59 years of civil conflict)
as similarly conflict-affected. Moreover, the data have been
extended by two years in order to cover the full period
between the observations of disease prevalence. Like LFT,
we use conflict data from Strand’s (2006) update of the
Biological Reviews 87 (2012) 163–167 © 2011 The Authors. Biological Reviews © 2011 Cambridge Philosophical Society
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Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al.,
2002). We estimate the following model using ordinary least
squares regression for country i:
Pathogen Severityi,2007 = α + β(log Conflict Prevalencei)
+ β(Pathogen Severityi,1946) + β(log Populationi)
+ β(log GDP per capitai ) + β(GDP Growthi)
+ β(Democracyi) + β(Political Instabilityi) + εi,
where α is the constant term, β is the estimated regression
coefficient for the respective variables, and εi is the error
term.
Table 1 presents the results of two models. Model 1 is a
reduced form model including only (log) conflict prevalence
1947–2006, pathogen severity in 1946, and a constant term.
Model 2 includes the controls found in LFT’s cross-sectional
estimates of conflict onset. All control variables were taken
from replication data provided by LFT. The results indicate
two key findings. First, past pathogen severity is strongly cor-
related with current pathogen severity, suggesting that there
are factors unrelated to conflict, economic development,
and political democracy that may account for the persis-
tence of pathogen severity over more than sixty years. These
factors are likely environmental: many pathogens, includ-
ing malaria, are more prevalent in tropical and subtropical
climates and at low altitudes (Sachs, Mellinger & Gallup,
2001). Second, there is a positive relationship between con-
flict prevalence and pathogen severity in 2007, controlling
for pathogen severity prior to conflict. Using the reduced
form estimates (Model 1), moving from five years of conflict
to 18 years of conflict (a one standard deviation increase) is
associated with an increase in pathogen severity in 2007 of
roughly one-third a standard deviation, or 1.9 points. Hence,
the research design LFT implement to test the relationship
between pathogen severity and civil conflict cannot substanti-
ate a causal argument. Disease prevalence is clearly in part an
outcome of conflict, and a correlation between conflict during
1946–2004 and pathogen severity in 2007 cannot be taken
as conclusive evidence that the latter causes the former. Since
conflict is a relatively rare event and the historical disease
prevalence data are only available at odd intervals, investigat-
ing this relationship with shorter time windows is less practi-
cal. However, restricting the analysis to the last twenty years,
we found results that are consistent with those presented
here (coefficient estimate on conflict incidence = 0.290,
p = 0.025).
The coefficient on (log) mean GDP per capita is negative
and highly significant in Model 2. This supports the notion
of an endogenous relationship between development and
pathogen severity: less disease-prevalent environments tend
to see higher levels of development, and higher levels of
development endow societies with greater resources to invest
in eradication of disease (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson,
2001, Price-Smith, 2002; Pritchett & Summers, 1996).
However, the relationship is not deterministic. Countries
located in initially unfavorable environments, such as
Table 1. Correlations between pathogen severity in 2007
(controlling for pathogen severity prior to conflict), and variables
relevant to the onset of conflict. The results of two models are
shown: (1) a reduced-form model, (2) a full model including
the control variables used in Letendre et al.’s (2010) cross-
sectional estimates of conflict onset. Pathogen severity in 2007
was calculated using the equation given in the text
Pathogen Severity and Civil Conflict Prevalence, 1947–2006
(1) (2)
Variables
Pathogen
severity,
2007
Pathogen
severity,
2007
Log conflict prevalence, 1947–2006 0.219∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗
(0.051) (0.053)
Pathogen severity, 1946 1.087∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.182)
Log mean population, 1946–2004 0.015
(0.046)
Log mean GDP per capita, 1946–2004 −0.401∗∗∗
(0.089)
Mean democracy, 1946–2004 −0.021∗
(0.011)
Mean instability, 1946–2004 −0.021
(0.466)
Mean GDP growth, 1946–2004 0.012
(0.019)
Constant −0.689∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.129) (0.431)
Observations 149 137
R2 0.368 0.530
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Singapore, have managed to overcome the challenges and
achieve high overall public health. We also note that many
efforts to eradicate disease have had explicitly political
motivations. For example, efforts to eradicate malaria
through draining the marshes in Southern Europe after
World War II were clearly in part aimed at containing
support for Communist parties (see Tognotti, 2009). The
negative coefficient for a country’s level of democracy in
Model 2 further suggests that better governance can foster
efforts to eradicate disease, as we would expect if democracies
have greater incentives to invest in public health (Lake &
Baum, 2001; Gizelis, 2009).
Our analysis here considers the potential for reverse causal-
ity between conflict and disease within the full time period
examined by LFT. Our results provide strong preliminary
evidence that a country’s past civil conflict experience can
account for some of the variation in current pathogen sever-
ity and casts doubt upon the arguments of LFT. However,
our analysis remains relatively crude, and there are many
possible ways to improve the estimates of the causal effects of
civil conflict on disease severity through more disaggregated
research (see Cederman & Gleditsch, 2009). For example,
disease severity is likely to be influenced by the magnitude of
the conflict, both in terms of the number of people involved
as well as its geographical scope (see Buhaug & Lujala, 2005;
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Lacina, 2006). Furthermore, more recent conflicts should be
expected to have a larger impact on disease severity than
more distant conflict experiences, and the impact of civil con-
flict on populations might also depend on other differences,
such as population growth and state capacity (see Turchin
& Nefedov, 2009). The paucity of comparable longitudinal
data on disease severity—the pathogen severity index is only
available for 2007 and the malaria prevalence data are only
available for a limited number of time points—makes it
difficult to examine the linkages between civil conflict expe-
riences and the impact on disease across countries in greater
detail. However, future research may use more detailed data
for individual countries to examine the specific mechanisms
whereby conflict experiences influence disease, as well as the
effectiveness of state countermeasures in promoting public
health.
III. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
In their article, LFT make a strong claim that pathogen
severity is the ultimate cause of civil conflict, and the authors
highlight the effects of disease on exacerbating resource
competition and xenophobia between ethnic groups. We
are skeptical of their proposed mechanism, and we believe
that their argument is inconsistent with other evidence from
research on civil war. Existing research does not indicate
any clear or robust relationships between resource scarcity
and civil war (see de Soysa & Neumayer, 2007) or greater
ethnic fragmentation and civil war (e.g., Fearon & Laitin,
2003). More generally, LFT seem to equate civil war with
intergroup conflict and ignore the key role of the state as an
actor in civil wars, which are explicitly defined as conflicts
between the government of a state and a non-state actor
in the Uppsala/PRIO data (Gleditsch et al., 2002, p. 619).
Existing research strongly suggests that ethnic differences
are only relevant for civil war insofar as states actively
discriminate and exclude ethnic groups, or when there are
large economic inequalities between groups (see Cederman
& Girardin, 2007; Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011;
Buhaug, Cederman & Rød, 2008). Moreover, violent conflict
is much more likely to arise over the distribution of rents
from natural resources rather than resource scarcity per se
(see Ross, 2004).
In our view, a more plausible and fruitful interpretation
of the relationship between disease and conflict is that
higher incidence of disease reflects important aspects of poor
governance and public goods provision by the state, and that
the same shortcomings that lead states to perform poorly
in public health also generate grievances and opportunities
that make countries more susceptible to violent mobilization.
LFT deserve credit for highlighting possible and potentially
interesting linkages between disease and conflict. However,
just as we believe that it is premature to exclude the
potential for reverse causality from conflict to disease, it
seems unfortunate to resort to relatively superficial biological
analogies and disregard the political motivations and strategic
elements determining why groups take up violence against
the state.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
(1) LFT test the effect of pathogen intensity in 2007 on
civil conflicts that occurred between 1946 and 2004, i.e.,
a period prior to the measurement of pathogen severity.
Their analysis is thus inadequate to assess the causal effect of
disease on civil conflict onset and does not take into account
the potential for reverse causality or that disease prevalence
may reflect prior conflict, as suggested by many prior studies.
(2) Our empirical analysis indicates pathogen severity in
2007 is positively related to prior conflict prevalence during
1947–2006, thus supporting our claim that civil conflict can
have important detrimental effects for public health and
disease.
(3) LFT argue that disease increases the risk of civil war
through its effects on resource scarcity and xenophobia. We
are skeptical of their proposed explanation, and existing
research on civil war does not support the assertion that
resource scarcity or ethnic fragmentation per se increase the
likelihood of civil war. LFT disregard the role of the state
as an active agent in civil war. Existing research indicates
that ethnicity is relevant to civil war only when the state
actively excludes or discriminates against certain groups,
and that resource distribution is more important for conflict
than resource scarcity.
(4) A more plausible and interesting interpretation of
the relationship between disease and civil conflict is that
higher incidence of disease reflects important aspects of poor
governance and public goods provision by the state, and
the same shortcomings that lead states to perform poorly
in public health also generate grievances and opportunities
making countries more susceptible to violent mobilization.
This is consistent with our empirical analysis, which
indicates that governance can influence disease prevalence,
as more democratic countries have lower pathogenic
severities.
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